The Coase Theorem and Property Rights

238 词 · 难度 5/5 · 类型 academic

A foundational principle in law and economics, articulated by Ronald Coase, challenges the conventional wisdom that externalities invariably necessitate governmental intervention. The so-called Coase theorem posits that, provided property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will yield an efficient allocation of resources irrespective of the initial distribution of those rights. This counterintuitive proposition emerged from Coase's scrutiny of regulatory responses to nuisances such as factory smoke affecting neighboring residents. Rather than assuming that the polluter must be restrained by legal decree, Coase argued that affected parties could negotiate a mutually advantageous outcome—for instance, the factory compensating residents or installing abatement technology—when bargaining is frictionless. However, the theorem's practical relevance hinges critically on the realism of its assumptions: in a world characterized by asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and substantial transaction costs, voluntary negotiations frequently collapse, thereby resurrecting the case for institutional or regulatory remedies. Consequently, the Coasean framework does not dismiss intervention outright but instead redirects analytical attention toward the comparative costs of alternative institutional arrangements. This perspective has profoundly influenced environmental policy, notably the design of emissions trading schemes that create property rights over pollution and allow market exchanges to determine abatement levels. By illuminating the intricate interplay between legal entitlements and economic efficiency, Coase's contribution remains indispensable for scholars grappling with the governance of externalities.